FRANCE AND ITS KINGS
According to William
Shakespeare no great political event should be without its ghosts, malignant or
benign. The practice of monarchs and
many others down the ages to conduct gatherings of high state at or close to
the tombs of the deceased of noble memory suggests that he did not exaggerate.
In the case of the
Declaration of Arbroath some of the ghosts were King Philip IV The Fair, died
1314, the father of Queen Isabel, wife of King Edward II; his eldest son King
Louis X, The Quarrelsome, died 1316; the second son King Philip V The Long, was
alive at the time and reigned 1316 to 1328.
The matter of France was
an integral part of the pattern of war and peace between the King of England
and the Scots, and could no more be ignored than the intricacies of the family
links and their implications. Certainly,
the problems of the relationship between Scotland and England may have been the
main event for the Scots, but for the King of England there were other
priorities.
There are two interesting
tests of those of the Kings of England, one is marriages that they made, and
the other is their image. A simple
answer for England would have been for a King or his heir to marry a daughter
or potential heiress of the King of Scots.
After King Henry I none did, and it is arguable that although his wife
Matilda (Eadgith) was the daughter of King Malcolm III, Caennmor, it was her
claim to the throne of England through her mother, St. Margaret, Queen of
Scotland, and the Princess Heiress of England, that was more significant in the
year 1100.
The Kings of England
married French and other Princesses from Europe, to bolster their claim to the
throne of France on the one hand and for size of the dowries on the other. Some daughters married into Scotland and in
the genealogies of the major English families there are some references to
marriages to the daughters of Scots Kings, none reliable, but they occur in
families of lesser nobility and knights, for example, the Hoo.
In the marriage market of
the Middle Ages, Scotland did not do well.
It was when the kin of the Kings of England had engaged in their mutual
destruction of the Wars of the Roses followed by the paranoia of the Tudors
that the market improved for the Scots Stuarts, King James IV was given the
hand of Margaret Tudor, daughter of King Henry VII.
The arrogant military
pretensions of King Henry VIII in his wars against France and Scotland, led to
closer Scots links to France, the marriage of a De Guise to King James V and
that of Mary, their daughter, first to the Francis II of France then and later
a widow to Darnley and a claimant to the Throne of England and left them
positioned to gain the Throne of England in 1603 and the levers of full power.
As for the image, until
the beginning of the 18th Century, the Arms of the King of England
had the Fleur-de-Lis of France in the first and fourth, the major quarters, and
of Anjou (the three lions) in the minor second and third. So the statement was to insist on the
principle that the King of England was de jure the King of France, and that
England was the secondary fief by virtue of the descent from the House of
Anjou. If this seems strange to the
modern mind, it would not be to the medieval.
The modern estimates of
population for the lands of the King of France at the turn of the 13th and 14th
Centuries in the time of King Philip IV vary between ten and twenty
million. It was a rich, fertile,
cultured political entity whose elite was long standing origins, and with a
system of Roman and Feudal Law that had developed its own characteristics.
In comparison, England was
populated by only about three million souls; was poorer, less cultured, plagued
by brigandage, and suffered persistent instability amongst the magnate
families. It was a land where an
intruded and small minority elite caste had held sway for eight generations
over a rabble of surly burghers and peasants who had maintained adherence to
their pre Conquest Common Law, Parish administration, and the concept of the
Hundreds and Wapentakes.
Eventually this was to
compromise the type of Feudal Law fastened on after 1066. The Norman Ascendancy needed the revenues,
manpower, and organisation that the old system could deliver. It did not have the numbers to man twelve
thousand parishes with its own men, only to dominate the larger entities, the
centres of power, and key areas.
To a Norman-French King of
England in the early 1300’s, the Robert de Brus, who had become King of Scots,
was a dangerous potential rival and had to be put in his place as a vassal or
eliminated, like several others. The
Brus began as liege men to the Montgomery kin of the Conqueror, all being
members of the Norman Ascendancy and then in fief to the King of England. Some of the turbulent Montgomerys’ and their
liege men, including the Brus had been sent north to remove them from the Welsh
Marches.
Since then the de Brus
family had gained ground, and had made marriages of crucial importance, putting
them within the networks of some of the great magnate families of England and
France. Not only did the de Brus
connection to the De Clare family bring potential allies, but blood kin as
well, King Robert I was directly
descended from King Henry I of England; son of King William The Conqueror;
through his bastard son by an unknown mistress, Robert, 1st Earl of
Gloucester.
In England the magnate
families, De Clare, Mortimer, Mowbray, FitzAlan, and others were still close to
cousins across the Channel. The
disasters of the reign of King John had lost them their feudal rights in the
Duchy of Normandy. The French upstart
Kings, entrenched by the early 1300’s could be dislodged only by a substantial
campaign. To make such an effort meant
the back door, Scotland, had to be secured, and the miserable failure of King
Edward II in 1314 meant that the brief period of opportunity offered by the
death of King Philip IV was lost.
For the Scots, they were
faced by a real dilemma. In theory one
might expect Normans to remain close to Normans, and Angles with Angles, and
there were plenty of both in the Scottish Lowlands; as well as Norse in the
north and in Cumberland to the south.
Moreover, there was a
scattering of other groups down both the western and eastern coasts of Britain,
for example old Scotti located in East Anglia as well as elsewhere. Also there were the forgotten simple migrants
of the Middle Ages, the descendants of those driven North by William the
Conqueror when he devastated much of Yorkshire and beyond. Then were added the smugglers, the slavers and
peripatetic traders who did not concern themselves much about the finer points
of nationality. But the immediate
political picture was much more complex.
Close association with an
England at war would affect Scottish trade with France and the Low Countries
badly and disproportionately. Also, as a
fief of the King of England they would be expected to provide men and treasure
for the continuing conflict with France.
With the very fine margins of the Scottish economy at the time, again
Scotland could suffer disproportionately if the wars went on. Given that most Scots trade goods were in
competition with those of England, the advantage lay in direct trade with the
continent to reap the full added value of their produce, and France was a prime
market.
If the simple question
were asked, where were the major sources of wealth and power in the Europe of
1320, the answer was France, the Low Countries and Burgundy, Saxony and
Bavaria, the Hanseatic League, the city states of Northern Italy, and
inevitably, the Papacy. The commercial
logic was to demerge from England and look for the best deal available on the
market.
In 1320 this had to be one
that would benefit both the leading religious and the secular interests in
Scotland, and meet the political needs of Scotland at the time. The logic of applying to a Papacy linked to
the Kings of France appeared to the small Scots oligarchy to be inexorable.
Any address to the Pope
was indirectly for the consumption and sympathetic ear of the French through
the major intermediary available in Christendom. If the Scots were to maintain their
separation from and discourage immediate incursions by the King of England then
Papal approval allied to the support of the French was critical. The haplessness of the reign of King Edward
II and the existing confusion and turmoil in England would not last forever so
long as it remained a single political entity under one king.
The reign of King Philip
IV The Fair is said by some to represent the apogee of the France of the Medieval
Age, before the emergence of France the nation state. It had grown by taking in, and sometimes
grabbing, overlordships within its grasp.
Navarre had been included, with failed attempts to expand in Spain.
The difficulty for a
potential client principality was that the King of France could be as arbitrary
and unpredictable in taxation and trade matters as any King of England. Additionally any direct approach to the
French by the Scots seeking an arms length overlordship might have the effect
of enabling a truce between the King of England and some of his Northern Lords,
who had their own ambitions, to resume warfare.
In 1302 Flanders had risen
against the King of France, and King Philip IV moved to deal with it. The Army of the King of France at that time
was the most formidable force in Europe, having a mass of heavy horse to deploy
in the charge as well as trained bands of other troops in support. The Flemings had militia on foot, in effect
infantry with few heavy and other horse.
At Courtrai when these armies faced each other, it was assumed that the
French would overwhelm the rebels.
However, the tactics the
Flemish militia’s adopted, massing groups of long pikes protected with
trenching and other obstacles, perhaps advised by Captains from parts of what
is now Germany, broke up the French cavalry charge and led to a massacre of the
French chivalry, five times greater than the losses of King Edward II in 1314.
King Robert de Brus
learned the lesson, but King Edward II did not, perhaps under the influence of
his Queen and her friends, and the result was the famous victory at Bannockburn
of 1314. Later, King Edward III of
England did learn the lesson, and added massed longbow men to his battle plans. The French, however, proudly carried on charging
with massed heavy horse, and losing, until after Agincourt in 1415.
The effect of the
settlement in Flanders after 1302 was to stimulate a series of large-scale
consultation meetings in France, together with the issue of Charters and
Liberties. These formed a critical part
of the settlement in Flanders, addressed problems with the Barons of France,
and dealt with the sensitivities of newly acquired overlordships, to maintain
the impetus of French expansion under King Philip IV and his successors.
Between what was happening
in France and in the Church in dealing with its subordinate agencies in the
period 1300-1320 in Europe there was a continuing blizzard of vellum documents
representing political and religious settlements and organisational arrangements
of one sort or another.
Another relevant European
set of events occurred in what is now Switzerland. In 1291 three of the mountain cantons under
the rule of the Habsburgs formed the Eternal Bond Of Brothers. In 1315 they went on to defeat a Habsburg
attempt to exercise direct control and the Pact of Brunnen allowed them a
quasi-independent status as a part of the Germanic confederation.
This arrangement suited
both the French, anxious to curb the Habsburg ambitions, and the Pope, by
creating a buffer state between the Papal States in Italy and southern Savoy
and the lands of Louis of Bavaria in the north.
The Swiss, possibly linked
to the early types of the Landsknecht pike men of the southern territories in
what is now Germany, proved impossible to defeat by the use of horsed troops
and the conventional mobbed foot levies of the time.
In that period the
Declaration was not unique, it was one part of a complicated and connected set
of events in a Europe where conflict and change were endemic over a long
period.
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