Remembrance

Civilians in uniform, the 4th Liverpool Pals, 20th Battalion, The Kings Liverpool Regiment, November 1914.

A Present For The President

The debate on who or what should occupy The Fourth Plinth in Trafalgar Square on a permanent basis has been rumbling on for a long while now. In the past my views have dodged about from one to another. Once, like others I thought that something other than famous military people from the past should be given prominence.

In a phase where science was in my thoughts I pondered on a group of Watson, Crick, Franklin, and Wilkins who gave us the key insights into DNA. Then from the past I thought of putting Davy and Faraday back together in the public eye.

Now I have changed my mind completely and believe that the occupants of The Fourth Plinth should be in the historical context of the square and should be two men of the period who we have to thank for one of the great British military achievements of the early 19th Century. They are men who served Wellington, who has monuments a plenty, who distinguished themselves heroically in battle and who deserve our recognition.

Now that President Obama has decided to revive America’s ancient enmity to Britain and to seek to destroy its wealth and capability we are relieved of the need to be polite to them or avoid praising our men who served in the battles against this rogue state of the past and present. When I suggested that he would begin to support Argentina, on cue according to The Telegraph, he has done just that.

So The Fourth Plinth should now be given to first class statues to the two men who burned Washington DC in August 1814, Major General Robert Ross and Colonel Arthur Brooke, standing side by side, their right arms raised and carrying torches in their hands. Ross, pictured above, was the commander of the Punitive Expedition to the Chesapeake following unprovoked American attacks on Canada and Brooke was his Deputy. Ross died in action and Brooke then assumed command.

Ross does have a monument at Rostrevor in County Down, he was an Ulsterman, by the Mournes but Brooke has no memorial in either Ulster, his birthplace as one of the Brookes of Brookeborough or England, he was resident in London and the Isle of Wight where he married a clergyman’s daughter.

This would be a statement, at least, that if America wants to exercise a foreign policy on the basis of ancient feuds, then at least we understand them. Also, when it comes to feuds, if America insists on meddling in the even more ancient disputes in Afghanisation, then Britain could pull out of the war and leave them to it.

As a parting gift we could send a copy of the portrait of General Sir William Nott that hangs in Camarthen for them to look at and wonder. He was one of the very few soldiers that came out of Afghanistan with his reputation intact and one of his staff was the nephew of Arthur Brooke.

President Obama might learn something from it.

Tanks Are Not Ministerial Limousines

When politicians these days head for photo opportunities to do with the Army they instinctively want to he associated with the most expensive and lethal hardware available. Sometimes it might work, but only rarely. They finish up looking either superfluous or ridiculous, usually the latter. Mostly it displays their deep ignorance of the nature and implications of military action.

The allegations that the UK part of the Iraq invasion in 2003 was a shambles that often verged on disaster are likely true. The Daily Mail reports that the current Chilcot inquiry is being denied access to top secret documents written by senior commanders that set out the many and various failures, lack of planning and on the hoof political decisions that put British troops into the firing line with wholly inadequate resources and support.

This is no surprise. At the time there were critics who included a number of persons almost invariably found amongst the most hawkish of commentators on military and related matters. When it is not only the usual flock of doves complaining about the use of force but a collection of hawks, falcons and eagles then something odd is going on. Amongst the birds of prey and scavengers was a familiar vulture.

I was moved to write to a leading journal who actually printed it, near defamatory jeers and insults included. It was not matters of principle that moved me; nor even the issues of national interest, prestige and world influence. It was the fact that the Government of the day were intending to embark on a military action that could potentially break down.

We have a not so proud record of disasters, shambles and rank bad decisions down the centuries amongst the great victories and triumphs, so there is a lot of experience to draw on. Movement was the key. Given the poor security and extent of political leaking at the time it was possible for an informed observer to work out a great deal. It was clear to me and to other deniers amongst the traditional hawks that the figures simply did not add up.

In order to achieve the objectives probable then the number and level of front line troops were such that unless immediate success occurred we could be in serious trouble. This was both in terms of effective reinforcement and in the support necessary for complex movement, perhaps rebalancing the forward elements, and in terms of making any tactical readjustments necessary let alone strategic.

Critically, the amount of hardware and its backup deployed allowed only a very fine margin once the troops had been committed. Yet this was the best case scenario given the figures. If you looked at who was going, the materials they had, what they were being given in support, their recent experience and the relevant training and analytical work and real intelligence available it was nowhere near enough.

In the outcome it was the US air superiority that enabled the speed of victory and in the aftermath it was the US command and resources that the British became wholly dependent on. All the problems that the British encountered after the collapse of the main Iraqi forces reflected the lack of planning and provision made at the outset.

Moving, supplying, controlling, deploying and maintaining command numbers of troops is an extremely difficult and complex business. Been there, done that and with more men, tanks, equipment and support than went to Iraq. The trouble is that propaganda films show tanks charging about with a fine disregard for terrain, distance, fuel consumption and maintenance and repair. What they do not show is the harsh reality of the difficulties of their deployment in battle conditions and huge scale of mechanical work needed to keep them available for action and to move them any significant distance within limited time frames.

Tanks are difficult beasts to feed and run. At the time I stated that they needed their own kind of tender loving care which could not be supplied on a just in time basis from the local garage. In the invasion of Iraq it simply wasn’t there in the same way that the needs of the infantry were not properly supplied.

The trouble was that the Iraq war was run by a government that could not tell the difference between a main battle tank and a ministerial pool limousine.

Afghanistan Reinforcements, 82nd Airborne Division

Checked out the Michael Yon web site this morning. If there is any doubt how many Americans and others regard the war in Afghanistan it is sobering to see what their current stance is relating to what should be done.

What has caused me to make sure I do not forget the UK, the US and others are engaged in this Christmas and into the coming year is the news, unmentioned in the UK media that the US is putting in the 82nd Airborne Division.

Anyone who has seen a screening of the film “The Longest Day” about the Normandy landings of June 1944 will recall the figure of an American parachutist who came down on the church in the village, was caught on hung from the spire whilst the action raged below him. I believe he was one of the 82nd who were dropped not long after midnight to attempt to secure the interior behind Omaha Beach.

By this stage of the war my family had moved from their city of my birth because of my father’s work. There were a few Air Force Americans at first straying in from air bases not too far away, but suddenly there were American troops in large numbers right on our doorsteps. At the turn of May and June 1944 most of them left leaving very few on their camps.

Youngsters soon forget, and they form just a vague memory of that time. It was only a handful of years ago, trawling web sites for some military history that I realised that the troops I had known all those years ago were the 82nd. The reason for their leaving was to go to Folkingham and North Witham in Lincolnshire to be flown to Normandy.

They seemed to be a great bunch of guys, open, polite, and bringing the film depictions of Americans to real life. A particular memory is of having to wait at the barbers for a hair cut, while a couple of Americans ahead of me were dealt with. When they were finished one took a long look at me and asked me if they had made me late for school.

I admitted it, but did suggest that on the whole I preferred reading comics in the barbers to doing arithmetic. But they handed over Hershey bars and gum in apology. On another occasion, the town Victory Parade, I was stuck at the back and could not see, so was allowed to stand on the Jeep bonnet to be given a clear view.

They were popular around town and were well thought of. In the music hall if a comic made jokes about Yanks that might have drawn laughs elsewhere they flopped badly with the local audience, many of whom would have known what the men they considered their friends had accomplished in France.

I wish the 82nd Airborne well and the best of fortunes in the same way as I wish those for our own. They have the duty of clearing up a politically bad business, amongst the most difficult of military tasks.

But I will not be chewing gum; the teeth now are not quite up to it.

Defence - At The Going Down Of The Sun

In 2003 when Bush and Blair launched the invasion of Iraq, I wrote a letter to a journal stating my doubts about the viability of the UK involvement. It was printed. The words I used have come back to haunt me, in that I wrote that “just in time” supply and management ideas applied to armed forces in action were a dangerous and damaging nonsense and liable to result in setbacks, risk defeat and lead to many unnecessary casualties.

My reason for writing was that I had looked at the figures, of men, material and support, and had concluded that not only were our troops in action overstretched, but that the supporting elements were far too few and too dependent on long distance logistics to maintain any campaign of substance or length.

Long ago I was one of a handful who had the job of keeping the log on the operational capability of the formation in which we served. Our job was to know where every tank was, every tank transporter, and their capability, with other information, so that they could take the field at one hours notice with all the supporting elements. In the field the situation had to be monitored continually.

It was clear that the UK Iraq project was being done without the necessary forces and support, and that everything depended on the Yanks being able to knock out the Iraqi’s within days rather than weeks.

It has been stated now that in the late 1990’s, notably under Brown’s control of spending, and Blair’s cut and shuffle politics of defence, applying concepts of business management based on the supply of frozen peas, detergents and DVD players to the waging of a bitter war was the reality. Engaging in military operations is inherently unpredictable, subject to daily major uncertainties, means losses that are incalculable, and requires large scale storage of essentials and the ability to move them at any distance at any time.

It applied to the situation that created the recent disaster of the Nimrod Aircraft. In relation to our ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, Armies, Air Forces, and Navies fighting in the East are not operated like supermarkets in Dunfermline or Sedgefield. Fighting enemies are not campaigns to gain marketing share, however much the bonus rich bankers and commercial executives in comfy offices peddling poisonous products would like to think. But these are the people that our politicians listen to. Having wrecked our economy and our health, they have been allowed to wreck our military capability.

As the Forces have too often learned in the past, supply and provisioning is critical to success or failure. In 1833, the government of the day, against Wellington’s advice, disposed of the supply Land Trains established in Napoleonic Wars. One result was the fiasco in the Crimean War when soldiers starved, froze and died of dysentery and worse. It does not apply only to the UK, Google “Napoleon-Moscow-1812” or “1941 Barbarossa”.

We have been very fortunate in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Yanks are there to plug the gaps and avoid the worst of the consequences without much in the way of complaint or sending the bills. Little has been seen about this. Left to Blair to organise, Brown to fund and the smarmy back scratching crew of hopeless inadequate political greasers at the Ministry of Defence to manage it would have been a great deal worse. As it is too many good men have been sacrificed, we are now almost helpless to defend ourselves at home or abroad, and all the government can do is to run to Brussels and Europe to hand over the responsibility.

Blair, Brown, and their cabals may be War Criminals, but let us not forget that above all they are traitors.

Arnhem & Market Garden - A Risk Worth Taking

This weekend marks the 65th anniversary of “Operation Market Garden”, the attempt to force Allied troops across the Rhine in September 1944 by means of a combined thrust through Eastern Holland and Airborne landings at the Arnhem Bridge. The conventional view today, peddled by all the armchair warriors, academics from the shelters of their university bunkers, historical and political theorists inspecting the latest entrails, and last but not least all the psychologists who have seen violence only in punchups in academic seminars over their egos, is that it was a fiasco, or a disaster, borne out of squabbles between commanders, their personal frailties, or stupidity.

The pictures displayed are of Montgomery talking to paratroops in training. Notice how they are sat down informally, whereas when our present politicians talk to troops they are always lined up in a parade position. The other is of John (Shan) Hackett, who commanded the 4th Parachute Brigade in 1944 at Arnhem with Field Marshal Montgomery and Major General Urquhart, GOC 1st Airborne Division. Hackett commanded the 7th Armoured Division some years later and one fine night he and I, and around 17,000 others rode down from the Elbe to the Rhine, just to see how it would go if we had to do it for real. He remarked that the journey took a lot less time than the trip in the other direction in 1945. There were a number around us, officers and men, who had been there and done that in 1944 and 1945. It was their view that Operation “Market Garden” was a risk that had to be taken.

They remembered the camps. There were very many of them in Northern Germany in 1944 and 1945. There were the prisoners of war on short rations, many of whom had been marched from the East and just survived, although many hadn’t. There were holding camps for refugees from the East, many of them displaced Germans, or those who also feared the Russians. There was little food or facilities for them. Then there were the other camps, the Concentration Camps. It was the 11th Armoured Division that found Bergen-Belsen in April 1945. Its Director of Medical Services calculated that over 30,000 had died there alone in the last few weeks before its liberation.

They remembered the situations they found in the German cities in Spring 1945, the ruins, the collapse of administration and services, the rates of mortality, the hunger and disease, typhus and cholera. It had been the same in Holland, and to a lesser extent in Belgium. The Danes and Norwegians were at risk. This was why in the autumn of 1944 that Montgomery, with the backing of Alan Brooke and others, decided to take the gamble that went against all the strategy and thinking they had adopted until that time.

They remembered Germany in 1918 and 1919, the political chaos, the hunger, the dangers to Europe of the collapse of so much government, law, and social structure. By 1944, the war had already gone on longer than the First War, and the extent of both physical and social damage was hugely greater with the larger scale of air and land operations. If we could force an armoured corps across the Rhine the early Autumn, and lead the 2nd Army behind the German defensive line, there was a chance that by the time winter set in of being at or across the Elbe and even reaching Berlin.

They remembered the home Atlantic Isles in the last year of the First War and after, and could see the developing situation there in 1944 and 1945. The removal from Britain of so many troops with all their logistics and support facilities had taken away a major support of the working and home population, never mind an informal source of extra food supplies. Civil authority was weakening. For all the propaganda and anxiety, the ordinary people were tiring, everything was badly run down, local services were in poor condition. It was all literally falling apart, and people were increasingly cold and hungry, the daily business of scratching around for basics had worn too many down. Remember this was the time when anti-biotics were new, in scarce supply and barely enough for military casuaties. It would be years before they were in common civilian use, so all the old scourges of disease were taking their full tolls of populations. In the south east corner morale had been damaged by the V Rocket raids and the fear they induced. Yet there was still a long, damaging, very nasty war in the East still to be fought and won, with apparently little hope of any Japanese surrender or willingness to talk.

That 30 Corps made it to close to the Rhine was an achievement in itself, the airborne assault at Arnhem was a close run thing, but failed in its main objective and the advance stalled. The later winter was a hard one. When assessing whether or not Operation “Market Garden” was a failure, and the casualties of that action are counted, set against it the figures of all those who died in Europe between, say, November 1944 and May 1945, and those who died after who might have survived had the war in the west been won earlier. Montgomery could see this and so could some others, sadly few of the Americans. It was a very high risk operation, heavier casualties were likely; despite the unfavourable intelligence it was the last chance before the winter, so the Operation went on.

So remember all those who died, and not only at Arnhem but in the camps and in the cities of so many parts of Europe in the Winter of 1944 and the Spring of 1945.

Afghanistan And Londonistan

When the news reached Tiberius of the debacle in the wild tribal interior of Germania after Publius Quinctilius Varus led the 17th, 18th, and 19th Legions, six cohorts of auxiliaries and three squadrons of cavalry to their deaths in 9 AD you may imagine his anger at the Emperor Augustus for putting a lawyer politician in direct charge of troops in a politically unstable area with a hostile aggressive population difficult to control at the best of times.

But this is history, and nothing to do with the present. General McChrystal is understood to have advised that the present USA strategy in Afghanistan is like a bull charging at a Matador. It is a graphic analogy, but not quite right. It is more like a bull charging the banderilleros and the picadores while they wear him down for the matador to finish him off.

To put it in simpler military terms, if you cannot bring the main force of the enemy to battle, and they remain mobile, unpredictable, and difficult to locate, then you have problems that are going to be difficult to resolve in the short term. To deal with them in detail entails a long hard expensive campaign, and critically keeping the citizenry in between on your side. This will add to the expense and the problems if they do not share your mindset.

On the other hand, you could follow the example of Sir Thomas of Hoo, Lord of Hoo and Hastings, who was active in the Caux in Normandy in the 1430’s, and that is to kill as many men as you can lay your hands on and disperse the remaining population. So instead of spending two generations trying to pacify an area, it will be at least two generations before anyone there can give you any trouble.

Better still; don’t get into that situation in the first place. But this is what happens when you have lawyer politicians in charge, especially from jurisdictions that rely on adversarial procedures both in the practice of law and its making. For the lawyer, ignorant of the realities of actual combat, the structures and organisation needed, and critically the demands of logistics, sending in the troops is just another legal ploy to try to make your point more strongly than the opposition. Moreover, lawyers tend to twist any figures and rarely look at the costs, until that is, they present the bills.

Which brings me to the UK and figures. The Army total manpower is said to be at around 100,000, or whom around 15,000 are committed in Afghanistan. As anyone familiar with military history knows, those in action now, will not be those in action even in a year or two, nor later. There is a rapid turnover. At the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 the 71st was claimed to have only 13 of the 800+ men who began the long march in Spain in 1808, and this was typical. I suspect the figure is right, having gone through the muster rolls of the 71st and others that are available. That was seven years.

In July 1945 when the 7th Armoured Division represented the British Army in the Allied Victory Parade in Berlin, many of the men there had not been with the division when the Battle of El Alamein was fought in late 1942. There had been remanning before invading Sicily in 1943, again for the 1944 Normandy landings, and after the advance through France further substantial remanning. In order to sustain this division of around 17,000 men a through put of about 75,000 men were needed on top of the normal extra-divisional military support. This was less than three years. We have been in Afghanistan now close to eight years.

So for the 15,000 there now, there will be those in the immediate reserve, and behind those, troops in first stage, and second stage training. So to sustain 15,000, now, others are in the immediate reserve, with a greater number needed for the future. In short, perhaps a half or more of the Army as it stands is required for the Afghanistan commitment. Of the rest, despite the out sourcing of much activity, it is only a small base on which to conduct overseas military operations. Also, it has to be remembered that the deaths and severe casualties are the smaller numbers. There are many more who have served already, perhaps several times, in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, who are still in one piece but beyond active service and are serving in the Army in other necessary capacities.

Now we come to the Metropolitan Police, on active service in Londonistan. The effect the lawyer politicians have had on this group of men and their management is deeply worrying. There have been two minor events recently, don’t believe the hype in the media, they have been trivial compared to some in the past. They are the G20 business and the recent confrontation between two groups of hooligans using football as an excuse. The Met’ has not done well; this is not the place to discuss it. What seems to be a major problem is the protocols and procedures married to command systems that cannot cope with a changing situation on the ground. There have been too many other bad examples recently.

At the West Ham ground the Met’ officers did not seem to know what they were doing or why and the hooligan groups were a hapless disorganised bunch of drunks, fat, unfit, and basically useless. The G20 protestors essentially were a random sample of activists. If the Met’ cannot handle this lot, what could happen if they are faced with groups that are anywhere near capable, half decently organised, sober, and with effective communications? The shambles at Kingsnorth with the Kent Constabulary does not suggest that any of the provincial forces could do any better, and some a great deal worse.

Where the two come together is closer than you may think. It was reported a few days ago that over the channel are 1000+ Afghans determined to come to Britain. Perhaps they are eager to take part in awareness courses under initiatives promoted by Harriet Harman. Perhaps they are hoping to find jobs in the expanding public sector. Perhaps they have watched so much Premier League football on satellite TV that they are eager to become football supporters. The point that we ought to consider is how many are already here, and how many more are in the pipeline. Add to those others of the same broad belief systems from neighbouring areas, and you begin to have some serious figures. Many may have been amongst the 100,000 or so “students” a year who disappear from the figures during or at the end of their course.

If you are a determined pessimist, you may calculate that not only are there far more militant Afghans and related others in Britain than there are British troops in Afghanistan, but the numbers of their reserves and recruits in Britain are much greater than the numbers in the British Army and the disparity is growing steadily. In less than three years in London there is to be a 16 day festival of sports under the Olympic product label, sponsored by consumer and financial product companies which will have the whole of the world’s media in attendance. So there is less than two years to have the organisation fully prepared and ready.

If the Army is still committed to Afghanistan with nothing to spare for internal security, and the Met’ and provincial police forces are still a bunch of jobsworth bureaucrats with mobile phones wandering and wondering what do to and when the various committees back at control make up their minds, what might happen?

Do Americans Care About British Soldiers?

The heading is taken from the post of August 19th by Michael Yon about the help given to rescue and treat one of our Rifles squaddies.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/

Click on the “more” button for the full story. It is astonishing. As someone who has done duty at field HQ level in dealing with Army emergencies over half a century ago, I can only wonder at the effort and expertise involved.

Moreover, Angels really do exist, but they are down here and not up there, and very concerned with the practicalities, ladies in America who pull out all the stops.

http://www.soldiersangels.org/

There is a time when cynicism is irrelevant, and I can only state my admiration and recognition of the services and conduct of all those involved.

Yet there is nothing in the British media, nothing from our government, nothing from any of our politicians to even hint or appreciate what is being done for our injured and our families.

But thanks to Michael Yon, there are some of us that do.

Ainsworth, Army, Kingsmen, Liverpool, Lenin

Mr. Robert William (“Bob”) Ainsworth is the present Secretary of State for Defence, and has encountered a certain amount of criticism since taking up post, relating to his personal experience and background. The name brings up memory, and the way all things connect.

22598 Private Charles Howard Ainsworth of the 20th (4th Pals Service) Battalion of the King’s Liverpool Regiment was killed in action on 30th July 1916 during the Battle of the Somme. His loss is recorded on the Thiepval Memorial, there is no grave, nor will one ever be found. On that day the 30th Division, with the 17th, 19th, and 20th Battalions launched an attack on Guillemont and encountered heavy shelling. Charlie was remembered as a good and brave man, and a steadfast friend.

From these three battalions alone almost 500 were killed, and an unknown number died later in the dressing stations and hospitals. To that should be added many more who were severely or otherwise injured. Most men were from Liverpool and of ordinary working background. Inevitably, because of the high rate of migration into the City from other parts of Britain and Ireland, many had other connections. In The King’s there were battalions of Scottish and Irish, there ought to have been a Welsh, the numbers were enough to support one. However, Ainsworth is a Lancashire name, taken it is said, from the old Township that lies between Bolton and Bury. I quote from the Ainsworth family web site:

“There are few famous people, but one of that name, Robert Ainsworth, 1660-1743, was a lexicographer who compiled a famous dictionary of Latin (Ainsworth’s Latin Dictionary, 1736) that was the standard work for at least 150 years and saw 24 authorized editions in England and two in Boston. He was a friend of Charles Wesley, the founder of Methodism, who mentioned their meeting in 1738 in his diary: “I was much moved at the sight of Mr. Ainsworth, a man of great learning, above seventy, who, like old Simeon, was waiting to see the Lord’s salvation; that he might depart in peace. His tears and vehemence and childlike simplicity showed him upon the entrance to the Kingdom of Heaven.”

The tragedy of the 30th July 1916 is made greater in that on 1st July, the first day of the Battle, the 30th Division, and the Pals, took all their objectives by an early stage of the day with limited casualties, and then waited, looking at open fields, for their orders. They had made a breakthrough that was never followed up because they were not expected to, and the Army staff was reluctant to change their plans. There was also a difficulty, in that to the right of the 30th Division were the French, and this was intended to be a British success, and not a French one.

The picture above is of a platoon of the 20th Battalion at Belton House, by Grantham after their battle training. They look ready for action, and they were. A photograph of the same men shortly after enlistment shows a group distinctly unready. Charlie, I have good reason to believe, is the on the front row, lying down, and on the far left. Had he survived The Somme, his chances were not good. In October 1916 there was the Battle of the Transloy Ridges. In February 1917 they were in the line outside Arras, and in April were involved in storming the Hindenburg Line.

Then it was up to Ypres for the Battle of Messines, followed by the Third Battle of Ypres at Passchendaele on the Menin Road. Then the Pals returned to the grind of the trenches at Arras. In February 1918 an Army reorganisation disbanded the 20th and its men were sent to other battalions in the Arras area, where they felt the full weight of the German onslaught of March and April, the Huns last attempt to wring victory from impending defeat. If Charlie had been still alive and been really unlucky and transferred to the 17th then after the Armistice of 11th November 1918 he would have found himself being sent to Russia to deal with the Bolsheviks.

Belton House is a popular National Trust venue, with a great many visitors. A classic 1930’s country house with all the opulence and comfort of that era, it is particularly well known as the place where Edward, Prince of Wales, and his lady friend, Mrs. Wallis Simpson, used to enjoy periods of private pleasure with their friends away from the prying media. It is this which brings in the punters. In the house there is one small memento of the Machine Gun Corps, which occupied the estate in the later part of the First World War. Of the Liverpool Brigades of the Kings and the Liverpool Pals there is not a mention nor any hint of their time there. Outside where some of the men, many of whom died, scratched their names and initials onto the walls of the stables, they have been sandblasted back to the brick, and cleansed from the memory of the National Trust.

In his younger days “Bob” Ainsworth was said to be a fervent Marxist and a believer in communist ways of running economies and government systems. Whether he was related to Charlie or not, I do not know; but there were other Ainsworths about in Liverpool. I wonder if any of them fought against Lenin?

Afghanistan - A Scrimmage In A Border Station

There are those saying that we are likely to be in Afghanistan for decades yet in order to stabilise the country and to establish a more democratic society. We will not be satisfied until the financial quarter of Kandahar has a fully fledged Hedge Fund industry, or something. There are a number of other reasons, which has led to the complaints about “Mission Creep”, that is added extra duties. The trouble with these is if you are neither able to impose them nor to carry them out. It was exactly this kind of political activity that gave us most of the Empire and caused us so much trouble in getting out of it when the profit margins had evaporated.

I had vowed to abjure military matters in this blog, but having seen that Michael Yon was with the British troops again, changed my mind. It was his dispatches from Iraq when he spent a great deal of time with them that told us so much more about the realities than all the MoD press releases and British media put together.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/night-into-day.htm is his latest posting and tells us all a great deal more about what is going on than we normally see. I had thought to cherry pick his piece, but it is much better for others to take a good look. The picture at the head is of the encampment at Kabul during the Afghan War of 1839 to 1842, and is from James Rattray’s “Costumes and Scenery of Afghanistan” of 1848. Few of those in the tents would have survived, Kabul was later a scene of disaster.

What is astonishing is that there is so much known from this encounter, and from the later war of 1878-1880, let alone all the activity on the North West Frontier in the time of Empire. Then there is the Russian experience of the 1980’s. There is no chance of the UK being there for decades, because it will break us first.

Harry Patch

The last Tommy has gone, and no more will march again. Harry of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry would have been in the line at Passchendaele in September 1917 at the same time as my grandfather, of the King's Liverpool. Harry was injured by shrapnel from shellfire, grandfather picked up a dose of mustard gas, but he was to return to Arras in time of the German Offensive of March 1918. His great grandfather stopped one at the Battle of Corunna in January 1809, but survived, with the 43rd Light Infantry, and the old 32nd, forerunner to the DCLI was in the line with them. I wonder if any of Harry's were there with him as well.

At the going down of the sun...............

HMS "Boadicea", D-Day, Normandy and Loss

To the memory of those lost on 13th June 1944, when HMS “Boadicea” was sunk by an enemy aerial torpedo off Portland Bill, having taken part in the Operation Neptune, the Royal Navy part in the Normandy Landings. There were only twelve survivors, as she sank within minutes.

“Boadicea” saw action at an early stage of the war in late 1939 in the Channel. In February 1940 she carried Winston Churchill from Boulogne to Dover. In June of that year she suffered severe damage and losses in the attempt to rescue the remaining troops of the 51st Highland Division from Le Havre and Dieppe. After repairs she then was involved in hunting the “Scharnhorst” and went on to the Russian convoys.

Later she escorted the RMS “Queen Elizabeth” on Atlantic crossings. From there she moved in October 1942 to the North Africa landings “Operation Torch” rescuing 425 survivors from the sinking of RMS “Viceroy Of India”. After more Russian convoys she moved to West Africa for other convoy work, rescuing survivors of MVS “Incomati”, then returning to Russia again.

In the Spring of 1944 she was moved to the Channel to prepare for “Operation Neptune”. On 6th June 1944 she escorted 31 tank landing craft of the 8th Armoured Brigade, the first main battle tanks to land, those of B and C Squadrons of the 4/7 Dragoon Guards. On 13th June she was returning to England for more escort duties, when she was attacked by a single German aircraft.


HMS BOADICEA CASUALTIES

MPK – Missing Presumed Killed

ABBEY, Samuel, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 648840, killed
ABBOTT, Eric, Stoker 1c, C/KX 595708, MPK
ALDRIDGE, Joseph A, Ty/Petty Officer Cook (S), C/MX 56877, MPK
APLIN, Walter S, Able Seaman, C/JX 206070, MPK
AVERLEY, Roland E, Ty/Act/Petty Officer, C/JX 171380, MPK
AYRES, William S, Signalman, C/JX 270008, MPK
BABB, Henry J, Assistant Steward, C/LX 623694, MPK
BAILEY, Basil, Ty/Supply Petty Officer, C/MX 69370, MPK
BAILEY, Walter, Electrical Artificer 2c, C/MX 47686, MPK
BAINBRIDGE, Robert, Able Seaman, C/JX 171168, MPK
BAINES, Cecil C, Able Seaman, C/JX 203299, MPK
BARLOW, John E, Ordinary Signalman, C/JX 360509, MPK
BARRETT, Charles, Ty/Act/Leading Stoker, C/KX 112565, MPK
BARRETT, Norman F, Able Seaman, C/JX 172342, MPK
BATES, Isaac, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 547920, MPK
BATTY, Leslie W, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 203439, MPK
BAYLEY, Leonard, Ty/Petty Officer Steward, C/LX 25120, MPK
BEARD, Alfred C, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, RNVR, C/LD/X 4594, MPK
BEST, Ronald S, Act/Able Seaman, C/JX 545708, MPK
BONSER, Leslie, Telegraphist, C/JX 172085, MPK
BOOTH, Ernest, Able Seaman, C/SSX 32825, MPK
BRADSHAW, Maurice, Able Seaman, C/JX 279253, MPK
BROCKBANK, Arnold R, Coder, C/JX 220450, MPK
BROWN, Roy, Assistant Steward, C/LX 614156, MPK
BROWN, Walter J, Able Seaman, C/JX 130753, MPK
BROWNE, Colin F, Able Seaman, P/JX 387837, MPK
BURNS, James, Stoker 1c, C/KX 115193, MPK
CAIN, George, Able Seaman, C/JX 255632, killed
CARTER, Antony A, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 566194, MPK
CARTWRIGHT, James S, Ty/Lieutenant, RNZNVR, MPK
CASWELL, William C, Stoker 1c, C/KX 533255, MPK
CASWELL, William L, Ordinary Telegraphist, C/JX 310590, MPK
CHEAPE, Robert, Stoker 1c, C/KX 141871, MPK
CHRISTIESON, Robert J, Ordinary Telegraphist, P/JX 574858, MPK
COCKER, James A E, Stoker Petty Officer, C/K 55218, MPK
COGHLAN, William F, Ty/Stoker Petty Officer, C/KX 88967, MPK
COLBY, Victor G, Chief Petty Officer, C/JX 129625, MPK
COOPER, George W, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 547160, MPK
COOPER, Jack, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 375785, MPK
CROOKS, Joseph, Able Seaman, C/JX 229961, MPK
CROSS, James L, Signalman, P/JX 221536, MPK
DARTON, Basil J, Able Seaman, C/JX 264027, MPK
DAVIS, Arthur, Able Seaman, C/JX 351712, MPK
DAYNES, Ronald G R, Petty Officer (Pens), C/J 91531, MPK
DIXON, Roy, Able Seaman, C/JX 1896084, MPK
DOBBIE, Charles, Canteen Assistant, C/NX 583911, MPK
DONALD, William H C, Ty/Surgeon Lieutenant, RNVR, MPK
DRAYCOTT, Albert E, Stoker 1c, C/KX 133409, MPK
DUNLOP, Thomas, Canteen Manager, C/NX 703740, MPK
DUROSE, Thomas R, Able Seaman, C/JX 302767, MPK
DURRANS, James, Coder, C/JX 356923, MPK
FARRER, Albert, Seaman, RNPS, LT/JX 255936, MPK
FEATHERSTONE, Leonard, Ty/Act/Sub Lieutenant (E), RNVR, MPK
FIELD, Albert, Able Seaman, C/JX 153660, MPK
FINDLAY, William H, Stoker Petty Officer (Pens), C/K 58306, MPK
FOX, Victor A, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 409101, MPK
FRAKE, Harry, Telegraphist, C/JX 343097, MPK
FRAZER, Richard A, Act/Able Seaman, C/JX 374362, MPK
GAMBELL, Arthur E, Stoker 1c, C/KX 528302, MPK
GARBUTT, George W, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 642297, MPK
GIBSON, Ronald E, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 238783, MPK
GILES, William, Ty/Stoker Petty Officer, C/KX 85268, MPK
GOGEL, Charles E, Petty Officer, C/JX 126789, MPK
GOLDING, Henry, Able Seaman, RFR, C/J 96118, MPK
GREEN, John H F, Ty/Stoker Petty Officer, C/KX 84242, MPK
HALLIDAY, James A, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 174038, MPK
HARDIMAN, Reginald T, Stoker 1c, C/KX 528920, MPK
HARRISON, Rain, Able Seaman, C/JX 377747, MPK
HAWKES, John D, Able Seaman, C/JX 548007, MPK
HAWKINS, Frederick W, Lieutenant Commander, MPK
HEMINGWAY, Brian, Ordinary Telegraphist, C/JX 572114, MPK
HENSHAW, Albert E, Able Seaman, C/JX 279347, MPK
HEPTON, John C, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 657768, MPK
HERON, Thomas, Able Seaman, RNVR, C/TD/X 1897, MPK
HINKSMAN, John H, Stoker 1c, C/KX 112583, MPK
HISCOCK, Roy A S, Able Seaman, P/JX 324133, MPK
HOLLANDS, William J, Ordinary Seaman, P/JX 628972, MPK
HOLLICK, Charles G, Able Seaman, C/JX 349598, MPK
HOYES, Eric, Lieutenant, MPK
HUDSON, Albert E, Ty/Petty Officer, C/JX 149695, MPK
HUGHES, Wallace E, Engine Room Artificer 5c, V/1805 (RCNVR), MPK
HUNTER, George R, Able Seaman, C/JX 248353, MPK
HURLEY, Henry F G, Able Seaman, C/JX 182708, MPK
INCE, Claude A, Cook (S), C/MX 122241, MPK
IRELAND, Eric F, Stoker 1c, C/KX 595754, MPK
JEFFREYS, Sydney J, Able Seaman, C/JX 172162, MPK
JOSEPH, Jack, Stoker 1c, C/KX 142822, MPK
KENYON, Harry, Able Seaman, C/JX 299418, MPK
KING, Alexander B, Ty/Act/Ty/Stoker Petty Officer, C/KX 83691, MPK
KNIGHT, James A, Able Seaman, C/JX 318013, MPK
LANG, William G, Able Seaman, C/JX 199928, MPK
LANGFORD, Leonard, Able Seaman, C/JX 317451, MPK
LAYTON, Kenneth C, Stoker 1c, C/KX 144027, MPK
LINDSAY, Thomas, Able Seaman, C/JX 237569, MPK
LLEWHELLIN, Edward J, Able Seaman, C/JX 372431, MPK
LOADER, Francis C, Able Seaman, C/JX 316619, MPK
LONG, Peveril S, Stoker 1c, C/KX 526066, MPK
LONGMORE, Frederick A, Telegraphist, C/JX 301586, MPK
MAGEE, Thomas, Able Seaman, C/JX 378086, MPK
MARSH, Ernest W, Able Seaman, C/JX 296482, MPK
MARTIN, Edgar, Able Seaman, C/SSX 32736, MPK
MAYES, Ernest G, Act/Able Seaman, C/JX 159703, MPK
MCMUNN, Robert, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 169655, MPK
MCNAB, Alexander, Stoker 1c, C/KX 576734, MPK
MCNICHOL, John F, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 259804, MPK
MESSENGER, George W, Able Seaman, C/JX 189828, MPK
MIDDLETON, Derrick L, Able Seaman, C/JX 318033, MPK
MILLS, Wilfred J, Able Seaman, P/JX 324132, MPK
MILNE, William K, Act/Stoker 1c, P/KX 178881, MPK
MOORES, John, Able Seaman, C/JX 352463, MPK
MORRISON, Bruce, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 549477, MPK
MOULTON, Eric, Able Seaman, C/JX 177791, MPK
MUMFORD, Cyril J, Engine Room Artificer 5c, C/MX 622056, MPK
MURRAY, James, Engine Room Artificer 3c, C/MX 53877, MPK
O'CONNELL, Robert, Able Seaman, C/JX 253994, killed
OKEY, John S, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 640140, MPK
PARKER, Edward, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 657192, MPK
PARKER, Samuel, Able Seaman, C/JX 240616, MPK
PEACH, Derek G H, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 547020, MPK
PECKHAM, Geoffrey S, Ty/Act/Chief Ordnance Artificer, C/MX 59291, MPK
PETTER, Ernest A W, Chief Electrical Artificer, C/M 39392, MPK
PHILP, Warren J, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 542203, MPK
PICKSTOCK, Francis J, Ty/Act/Petty Officer, C/JX 127028, MPK
PIKE, Grayham W J, Stoker 1c, C/KX 112588, MPK
POWELL, George W, Cook (O), C/MX 71156, MPK
PRESTON, Ralph E, Ty/Leading Supply Assistant, C/MX 95277, MPK
PRICE, Gerald J, Ordinary Seaman, P/JX 515835, MPK
QUINLAN, Leslie B, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 549510, MPK
RAMSAY, Robert L, Sick Berth Attendant, C/MX 557042, MPK
RAYMENT, Laurence V, Able Seaman, C/JX 153300, MPK
REES, John R, Ordinary Signalman, C/JX 361273, MPK
RENNIE, John A, Ty/Sub Lieutenant, RNVR, MPK
REYNOLDS, Walter C, Able Seaman, C/JX 300420, MPK
RICHARDSON, Alan, Able Seaman, C/JX 353996, MPK
ROBINSON, John E, Leading Writer (Sp), C/MX 621804, MPK
ROBINSON, Keith, Ty/Sub Lieutenant, RNR, MPK
ROBSON, Thomas W, Able Seaman, RNVR, C/TD/X 1808, MPK
ROGERS, Sydney, Able Seaman, C/JX 299186, MPK
SAGGERS, Vivian G, Stoker 2c, P/KX 596983, MPK
SAMPSON, James E, Chief Petty Officer Stoker, C/K 62282, MPK
SCHRODER, Frederick J, Act/Lieutenant (E), killed
SEGGAR, John D, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 251844, MPK
SELBY, Wilfred H T, Able Seaman, C/JX 208640, MPK
SHAW, Dennis R, Able Seaman, C/JX 353099, MPK
SIMPSON, Donald A, Able Seaman (Pens), C/J 21934, MPK
SMITH, Alexander, Ty/Leading Stoker, C/KX 83513, MPK
SPENCELAYH, William McM, Ty/Yeoman of Signals, C/JX 138686, MPK
STEVENS, William, Able Seaman, C/JX 318082, MPK
STEVENSON, Reginald D, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 308148, MPK
STUBBINGS, Leslie F, Stoker 1c, C/KX 135233, MPK
SUMMERELL, Roland, Able Seaman, C/SSX 24948, MPK
SUTCLIFFE, Arthur, Able Seaman, C/JX 386616, MPK
TANNER, George W, Ty/Leading Seaman, C/JX 262802, MPK
TAYLOR, Alfred, Ordnance Mechanic 4c, C/MX 92966, MPK
TAYLOR, Dennis E, Act/Petty Officer Radio Mechanic, P/MX 116699, MPK
TAYLOR, John W, Ty/Act/Petty Officer, C/JX 226637, MPK
TENWICK, William J E, Able Seaman, C/JX 320246, killed
THOMSON, Alexander, Able Seaman, C/JX 321070, MPK
THOMSON, Robert W, Able Seaman, C/JX 373084, MPK
TONKIN, Ronald J C, Engine Room Artificer 3c, C/MX 51286, MPK
TORKINGTON, Joseph H, Ty/Act/Leading Seaman, C/JX 196736, MPK
TUCKER, Frank W, Ordinary Seaman, P/JX 425767, MPK
TUCKER, John A, Stoker 1c, C/KX 137810, MPK
TURPIN, John H, Able Seaman, C/JX 354263, MPK
WARDBY, Thomas E, Ty/Act/Leading Stoker, C/KX 121224, MPK
WEDDERBURN, John, Petty Officer Telegraphist, C/JX 132489, MPK
WHITE, George W, Able Seaman, C/JX 213275, MPK
WHITE, Sylvester, Ty/Chief Ty/Petty Officer, C/JX 127568, MPK
WHITE, Thomas C, Able Seaman, C/JX 372496, MPK
WHITTAM, William, Stoker 1c, C/KX 107360, MPK
WILSON, Lewis L M, Ty/Sub Lieutenant (E), RNVR, MPK
WRAIGHT, Frederick J W, Stoker 1c, C/KX 596340, MPK
WRIGHT, Leonard, Act/Stoker 1c, C/KX 137319, MPK
WYNNE, Norman, Able Seaman, C/JX 375552, MPK
YOUNGER, Walter S, Stoker 1c, C/KX 135279, MPK

Back To Mercantilism Part 2

In the news in recent days are reports that China is considering the reorganisation and expansion of its Navy. What was it I said on Wednesday 4 March on "The Mercantilist System - Back To The Future"? Despite all the economic difficulties its government feel it is now the time to add to its military and space capabilities with more firepower and political clout on the seaways. Historically, we have been here before and too many times. Indeed the Chinese have been here before, in the early years of the 1400's, when not only did they create a huge seagoing force, but they sent it out to establish their presence where nobody else had been before. If Gavin Menzies is correct in 1421 (see the web site of that date) the Chinese discovered America.

But then with a change of regime, the new Emperor simply closed down, and withdrew China to its internal affairs, and policing its land borders. Why is debated, my guess is that the money ran out and the economy had been badly damaged by the scale of the venture. Soviet Russia in the 1960's puffed up by success in space, aware that the size of its Army scared the West, and with all the economic figures on green (alas all faked and manipulated) decided on a major naval expansion. It is my belief that it was this that eventually broke the back of the Soviet economy when all the statistical fakery could no longer be sustained, and the Afghans had hurt the Army, to add to all the burdens of the budgets.

In the past a few other nations have found naval expansion and the rest an expensive business. We in the UK were very proud of our navy, we were told to be, and many of us had family in the business. But it cost us a great deal, distorted the economy and all too often our naval reach, coupled with political arrogance, took us into places we would have done better to avoid.

There is an old Chinese curse, "May you have an interesting life." With a big navy and even bigger commitments, the Chinese may have cause to remember it.